This paper proposes a risk-based explanation for momentum profits and the value premium in a unified investment-based model. Winner firms have higher short-term profitability and investment commitment than loser firms, and hence their sensitivity to investment-specific technology shocks is higher. Value firms have lower long-term profitability and higher operating leverage than growth firms, and hence their exposure to aggregate productivity shocks is higher. The model reproduces the coexistence of momentum and value, the failure of the unconditional CAPM in explaining momentum, the predictability of momentum profits by market states, and the long-horizon reversal of momentum profits.
Introduction
Momentum and value are two of the most popular and profitable investment strategies associated with equity markets. Indeed, based on US data from 1930 to 2011, the difference in average returns between past winners and past losers is about 13% per year, and the difference between growth firms and value firms is about 6.3% per year. The large and robust profitability of these two investment strategies has captured the attention of financial economists, and significant progress has been made in explaining these observations, from both rational and behavioral viewpoints.
Despite this progress, however, no unified risk-based explanation has been proposed for these two investment strategies. Indeed, most frameworks that rationalize the value premium predict that the expected returns for past winners should be lower than for past losers (e.g., Zhang (2005)), whereas most frameworks that rationalize momentum (e.g., Johnson (2002)) predict a negative value premium. The reason for this result is that value (growth) firms are similar to loser (winner) firms in many aspects, yet the returns from these two strategies are strongly negatively correlated. Hence, rationalizing one phenomenon makes it very difficult to reconcile the other, and most of the literature that studies these phenomena in a rational expectations framework focuses on only one strategy while remaining silent on the other. This paper attempts to fill this gap by proposing a unified risk-based explanation for momentum profits and the value premium in an investment-based framework. It reproduces several important aspects of stock returns in the cross section, including: (1) the coexistence of positive and sizable momentum profits and value premium; (2) the negative comovement of momentum profits and the value premium; (3) the failure (success) of the unconditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in explaining momentum profits (the value premium), as in the long sample 1930-2011; (4) the predictability of momentum profits by market states as in Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) , and momentum crashes as documented in Daniel and Moskowitz (2011) ; (5) the long-horizon reversal of the profitability for momentum strategies; and (6) the size premium and the long-term contrarian effect.
Standard Fama-French methodology that is used to form book-to-market portfolios is based on using data 6 to 18 months prior to portfolio formation in order to guarantee that the required accounting information will be available at portfolio rebalancing time. Momentum strategies, on the other hand, focus on stock market performance over a shorter horizon; depending on the specific strategy, the horizon varies from 3 to 12 months prior to the portfolio rebalancing. If the information content is different for the basis of these two strategies, their sources of risk exposures may also be different.
Building on the framework of Zhang (2005), I develop an investment-based asset pric-ing model with two aggregate risk factors and demonstrate that winner/loser firms and value/growth firms load on these factors differently. The first factor is total factor productivity (TFP) shocks. This is by far the most important driver of aggregate fluctuations in a neoclassical framework and is the standard aggregate shock in a one-factor production economy. The second factor is investment-specific technology shocks (or I-shocks). Introduced in the macroeconomic literature, I-shocks measure the technological innovations in investment goods, such as equipment and software, and these shocks directly affect firms' the capital accumulation decisions. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) and subsequent papers show that investment-specific shocks can explain a substantial fraction of growth and variation in output and hours over the business cycle. In addition to the two aggregate shocks, another important ingredient of this model is the investment commitment. Plants and factories take time to build, and undoing investment plans is very costly.
1 Deviating from the standard business cycle literature, I assume a twoperiod investment structure: firms make investment decisions today, but can complete only a small fraction of these investments. A commitment is made at the same time to complete the remaining larger fraction in the next period. Undoing committed investments is costly, and I capture this feature by specifying an asymmetric quadratic adjustment cost. Together with I-shocks (which are proxied by the price of investment goods relative to consumption goods), this friction implies that firms with greater investment commitments will be more sensitive to the changing price of investment goods. The intuition for momentum profits in the model is as follows : winner firms are "lucky" ones that had high profitability in the recent past (one to two years). They initiate more investment and make a greater commitment to future investment. Investment commitment is risky because it is in terms of future capital expenditures. In a world in which the price of investment goods is stochastic, winner firms will therefore have a high risk exposure to Ishocks. On the other hand, loser firms suffer from recent low profitability. They initiate less (more) investment (disinvestment) and commit to less (greater) investment (disinvestment) in the future. The commitment to disinvest serves as a hedge to loser firms, as a higher price of investment goods in the future implies that fewer units of existing capital need to be resold, which to some extent relieves the pain originating from the recent low profitability. Therefore, loser firms have a low (or even a negative) exposure to I-shocks. When the risk price of I-shocks is positive, the winner portfolio will outperform the loser portfolio on average, giving rise to a positive momentum profit. In Section 4.5, I provide empirical evidence for a positive risk price of investment-specific technology shocks using 10 size, 10 book-to-market, and 10 momentum portfolios from Kenneth French's Web site.
2 The story for momentum profits is therefore consistent with the findings of Liu and Zhang (2011) that winner (loser) firms have a high (low) expected sale-to-capital ratio and expected growth rate of investment-to-capital ratio. It also provides a potential theoretical foundation for the strong explanatory power of the return-on-equity (ROE) factor on momentum portfolio returns as documented in Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2012) . The mechanism for the value premium in the model is similar to that in Zhang (2005) and Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) . Unlike loser firms, value firms are those which have experienced a series of bad firm-specific productivity shocks in the long-term past, and their stock prices have been significantly depressed. Given the fixed operating cost and asymmetric quadratic adjustment cost, these firms have a very high operating leverage and are highly sensitive to the business conditions, as measured by the TFP shocks in the model. Therefore, the expected returns of value firms be higher than those of growth firms, due to firms' different exposures to TFP shocks.
It is worth noting that these two mechanisms work simultaneously. For example, loser firms have a low exposure to I-shocks. However, their recent bad profitability shocks also drive up the operating leverage, and their exposure to TFP shocks is higher than winner firms. Since the market return is mainly driven by TFP shocks, this explains why the CAPM fails to capture momentum profits and the abnormal return spread is greater than the return spread. In addition, because the investment commitment is a two-period structure, the risk exposure to I-shocks is short-lived. Therefore, two or three years after portfolio rebalancing, the exposure to TFP shocks becomes dominant, giving rise to a reversal in the profitability of momentum strategies. Similarly, because the value premium and momentum profits have opposite loadings on TFP shocks, they are negatively correlated.
The predictability of momentum profits by past market returns, as documented in Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) , is a conditional effect. Intuitively, when the market went up in the recent past, the stocks in the winner portfolio tend to have a high market beta because they tend to move in the same direction as the market. Therefore, the momentum spread portfolio, which takes a long position in the winner firms and a short position in the loser firms, has a positive exposure to the market factor. Since winners also have a higher beta to I-shocks, this implies an expected return of the spread portfolio that is positive and high. When the market went down, on the other hand, the momentum spread portfolio has a 2 The risk price for I-shocks is still debatable in the literature. Papanikolaou (2011) documents that the risk price of I-shocks implied from the value premium is negative for the post-1963 sample. Garlappi and Song (2012) , however, question the sign for the risk price and find that the inference from book-to-market portfolios no longer holds in the longer sample . See Section 4.5 for further discussion.
negative exposure to the market factor because the loser firms now have much higher market betas than the winner firms. In this scenario, these two factors offset each other, generating expected momentum profits that are low or even negative. In extreme cases when the market crashed, the force of the market factor dominates that of the I-shocks, providing a risk-based explanation for "momentum crashes" documented in Daniel and Moskowitz (2011) .
Further implications of this model include the firm size effect and the long-term contrarian effect. The intuition is that firms with a small market cap and low long-term prior returns are firms that had suffered from low productivity in the long run. Similar to the value firms, they have a high operating leverage and a hence higher exposure to TFP shocks (and the market factor) and higher expected returns. This intuition is confirmed both in the simulated data and in the empirical data. The coexistence of short-term momentum and long-term contrarian effects reconfirms that different information regarding risk exposures is contained in different horizons of the prior stock returns.
This paper is related to the existing literature along several dimensions. First, my paper enriches the growing body of literature that strives to rationalize the momentum profit by linking it to the firm's investment and real economy. Liu and Zhang (2008) find that the growth rate of industrial production can explain more than half of momentum profits, as recent winners have temporarily higher loadings than recent losers on the growth rate of industrial production. They argue that if the industry production factor summarizes the firm-level changes in expected growth, then the factor loading should be high among stocks with high expected growth. Consistent with their argument, they find that winner firms tend to have higher expected growth than loser firms. More recently, Liu and Zhang (2011) study momentum profits in a structural estimation of the q-theory of investment and find that the investment-based model can capture the cross-sectional return variations of momentum portfolios. In particular, they document that the higher expected growth rate of the investment-to-capital ratio and the high expected sales-to-capital ratio are the two most important sources of momentum profits. Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2012) propose a new investment-based four-factor model and empirically document that the ROE factor can capture the cross section of momentum portfolio returns.
3 My paper goes one step further and explores how interactions between the investment commitment and investment-specific technology shocks can generate the joint dynamics of firm-level productivity, real investment, and momentum portfolio returns. Second, this paper is related to the literature that provides a risk-based explanation for the value premium. Among others, Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) study the effect of optimal investment decisions on a firm's systematic risk in a dynamic equilibrium model and find that book-to-market summarizes the firm's risk exposure and hence its expected return. Zhang (2005) finds that costly reversibility and the countercyclical price of risk make value firms more risky than growth firms. Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) emphasize the importance of operating leverage in explaining the value premium. Cooper (2006) studies the effect of investment irreversibility and fixed adjustment cost, and Lettau and Wachter (2007) adopt a duration-based explanation for the difference between value and growth stocks. Except for Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) , who generate a counterfactual momentum effect at a longer horizon, none of these papers explicitly address momentum phenomenon. My paper builds on the mechanisms proposed by Zhang (2005) and Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) to generate the value premium by adding a second risk factor and the friction of investment commitment, and generates the coexistence of positive value and momentum. Lastly, a large macroeconomics literature studies the impact of investment-specific technology shocks on economic growth and business cycles. For example, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) , Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000), and Fisher (2006) show that investment-specific technology shocks can explain a large fraction of the growth and variations in output. Papanikolaou (2011) introduces investment-specific technology shocks into a two-sector general equilibrium model and explores the asset pricing implications of this type of shock by studying its differential impact on assets-in-place and growth options. My paper relates investment-specific technology shocks to momentum profits.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamic investment-based model, and Section 3 discusses the empirical data and the calibration procedure. In Section 4, I present the main results from both the simulated data and the empirical data, and explore the intuition behind the model. Section 5 concludes with some final remarks. Details about data construction and numerical solutions are found in the Appendix.
The model
I develop a dynamic investment-based asset pricing model with heterogeneous production units (or firms), where the stochastic discount factor is exogenously specified.
Production
The economy has a large number of firms, and the decision of each firm is made independently of each other. Firms use physical capital to produce outputs and make a choice between dividend payout and investment expenditure to maximize the firm's value. The output Y it of firm i at time t is given by the production function
where X t is the level of aggregate productivity, and Z it is the level of firm-specific productivity. The coefficient α < 1 features the decreasing returns to scale of the production function.
In each period, firms decide on the amount of output to pay out as dividends (negative dividends are considered as equity issuance), and the remaining is used as capital expenditure. Departing from standard real business cycle models, investment has a two-period structure: firms that initiate new investment at time t can complete only a small fraction in that period; they also make a commitment to complete the remaining large fraction in the following period t + 1.
4 5 One may impose the restriction that the newly installed capital can be productive only after both fractions are completed, but this adds one more state variable, making the numerical solution even more computationally demanding. Therefore, I make the simplifying assumption, as Kuehn (2007) does, that the fraction of capital is productive immediately after it is installed. Denote the small fraction of the first period by w, the newly initiated investment expenditure at time t by L it , the depreciation rate of physical capital by δ, and the investment-specific technology level by Q t . The capital accumulation follows:
As discussed in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) , Q t maybe interpreted in two ways. First, 1/Q t can be thought of as representing the cost of producing a new unit of equipment in terms of final output. Equation (2) can be read as follows. The next period 4 My investment commitment structure is similar to Kuehn (2007) . In his dynamic general equilibrium model, Kuehn (2007) considers an infinite horizon investment commitment, with the committed amount geometrically decaying over time. This structure greatly simplifies the solution of his model, as all previous committed investments can be captured by a single state variable. My commitment structure is slightly different in that the committed investment is only one period ahead.
5 See also Lamont (2000) and Jones and Tuzel (2012) on the asset pricing implications of time-to-build and investment commitment (or investment plan).
capital stock is the sum of nondepreciated capital and the new investment, which equals the ratio of total capital expenditure to the price of equipment. Alternatively, Q t can also be interpreted as the efficiency of transforming outputs to physical capital while keeping the cost of producing one new unit of equipment constant over time. An increase in efficiency implies that one unit of output can be transformed to more units of physical capital. Throughout the rest of this paper, I will stick to the first interpretation, as it corresponds to the definition of investment-specific technology shocks from empirical data. However, both the price and efficiency changes are important.
Equation (3) indicates that the total capital expenditure of a firm at time t has two components: one from the large fraction of investment committed in the previous period (1−w)L it−1 , and the second from the small fraction of newly initiated investment wL it . This structure of capital accumulation implies that when firms make an investment commitment, they will have to take into account the stochastic feature of the price of investment goods. The more capital expenditure a firm commits to, the higher exposure it has to I-shocks. Put another way, the investment commitment rate is a natural proxy for the risk exposure to I-shocks in this model. An adjustment cost is incurred when firms initiate investment, and it takes the following quadratic form:
where the adjustment cost coefficient c controls the curvature and takes different values when firms make investment and disinvestment decisions. In particular,
and c − > c + ≥ 0, capturing the effect that it is more costly to disinvest than to make a positive capital expenditure. Zhang (2005) shows that this asymmetry is crucial in generating the value premium in his dynamic equilibrium model. A firm's output Y it equals the sum of its investment I it , capital adjustment cost G(L it , K it ), operating costs f , and dividend payout D it :
Equilibrium
Given the pricing kernel {m t } and shock processes for {X t }, {Q t }, {Z it }, which I will specify in the next subsection, the firm's problem can be described in the following recursive form:
Intuitively, a firm's cum-dividend market value is the sum of the dividend (the first term on the right-hand side) and the present value of the firm's continuation value (the second term on the right-hand side), when the firm optimally chooses an investment commitment to maximize the firm's value. The optimal investment commitment is determined by the first-order condition on the right-hand side of (7) and depends on the economy-wide and firm-specific states. All else equal, when a firm experiences a high level of productivity, it may choose to make a greater investment commitment, since the benefit from the continuation value dominates the cost from the dividend payout, especially when the profitability is persistent. On the other hand, when a firm has excess capital and experiences a low level of productivity, it may choose to initiate less investment or greater disinvestment.
When numerically solving this model, it is more convenient to scale the second state variable L it−1 by firm-level capital. As such, the firm's problem can be translated to
and the gross return R U it+1 for firm i is calculated as
Up to this point, firms are assumed to be all equity financed, and the stock return in (9) is interpreted as an unleveled return. In practice, most firms have a certain amount of outstanding debt, which affects both the mean and standard deviation of stock returns. To address this issue, I follow Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) and assume the same constant leverage ratio Φ for all firms. Therefore, the levered excess return for stock i is
where R f is the gross risk-free rate.
Exogenous shocks and pricing kernel
The aggregate productivity X t , idiosyncratic productivity Z it , and investment-specific technology level Q t are assumed to be exogenous and follow AR(1) processes, which represent a detrended economy:
The bars above X and Q stand for their means, ρ x , ρ q , and ρ z measure the persistence, and the innovations The pricing kernel is specified as a function of the aggregate productivity shock and the investment-specific technology shock:
where γ x > 0, γ q > 0 measures the constant risk prices. E t denotes the time-t conditional expectation. This specification of the pricing kernel, following Yang (2011), guarantees the interpretation of r f as the risk-free rate. To see this, one can simply take the conditional expectation on both sides of equation (14) and get
In words, the market price of a one-period risk-free bond (the right-hand side) equals the sum of one-period state prices across all states (the left-hand side).
Data and Calibration
In this section, I describe the data used for empirical analysis and model calibration. The details of variable construction can be found in Appendix A-1.
Data
Following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) , I define the investment-specific technology shock as the negative change in the price deflator of investment goods relative to that of nondurable consumption goods from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA):
By definition, a positive I-shock implies technological progress in the investment sector that induces a lower price for investment goods. Strictly speaking, two consequences for investment goods are usually associated with investment-specific technology progress: lower prices and better quality. A perfect measure of I-shocks should have both consequences carefully taken into account. As noted in Cummins and Violante (2002) , the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has incorporated partial quality adjustment in several components, including computers and peripherals, starting from 1958. However, some economists contend that a significant amount of quality change goes unmeasured in the official statistics (see, for example, Gordon (1990) ). To alleviate this concern, I also use an alternative measure of I-shocks from Kogan and Papanikolaou (2012) based on real quantities as a robustness check in Section 4.5.
The returns of standard momentum portfolios, book-to-market portfolios, and risk factors are from Kenneth French's Web site. These factors include the market factor (MKT), the high-minus-low value premium factor (HML), and small-minus-big size factor (SMB) used in the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and the up-minus-down momentum factor (UMD) in the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. For macroeconomic variables, GDP growth, nondurable consumption growth, and the growth of service are provided in NIPA Table 1.1.1. The full sample is from 1930 to 2011, where the starting year is constrained by the availability of macroeconomic data. Table 1 summarizes the risk factors and macroeconomic variables by reporting their means, standard deviations, maximum, median, minimum, and cross-correlations. The annual mean and volatility of I-shocks are 1.06% and 3.60%, respectively, an indication of relatively stable drops in the price of equipment and software during the past 80 years. It should be noted that the relative price series may underestimate the volatility of investment-specific technology shocks. As pointed out by Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011) and emphasized in Papanikolaou (2011) , nominal rigidities may generate a smoother relative price of investment goods than the underlying investment-specific technology shocks. In addition, the insufficient quality adjustment in the price deflators from NIPA may further strengthen the underestimation.
[Insert Table 1 Here] The I-shock has a strong positive comovement with business cycle variables such as GDP growth, non-durable consumption growth, and service growth. In an economy with a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) representative agent, the agent will demand a positive risk premium for this procyclicality. The correlation between the I-shock and the UMD factor is positive 0.32 and significantly different from zero, implying potentially different sensitivities of momentum portfolios to the changing price of equipment and software.
On the side of standard risk factors, the average momentum factor (UMD) is 7.81% per year, almost double that of the value premium factor (HML) and the size premium factor (SMB). The UMD factor has a negative correlation with MKT (-0.28), consistent with the findings in the momentum literature that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) not only is unable to explain momentum profits but also generates a Jensen's alpha spread even greater than the momentum return spread. The correlation between the UMD factor and the HML factor is -0.29. Given the fact that winner (loser) firms are similar to growth (value) firms in many aspects, this is one of the main reasons why most of the theoretical studies going for a risk-based explanation focus on only one phenomenon rather than both.
Calibration
To align with the investment commitment feature in the empirical data, I calibrate the model at an annual frequency. Therefore, my model implies a completion of investment in two years, which is consistent with the empirical findings by Koeva (2001) , who documents that the average length of time-to-build is approximately two years in most industries.
The key parameter values in the model are summarized in Table 2 , and the target moments from simulation of the model are reported in Table 3 .
[Insert Table 2 Here] [Insert Table 3 Here]
The elasticity of output with respect to capital α in the production function equals 0.36, following Gomes (2001) . The annual depreciation rate is set to 0.13, close to the empirical estimate of 0.12 by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) . The adjustment cost coefficients c + and c − affect the autocorrelation and volatility of the firm-level investment rate. I set c + to 0.12 and c − to 4, capturing the effect that it is much more costly to disinvest than to make a positive capital expenditure. These two adjustment cost parameters combined imply an average volatility of firm-level investment of 12.8% and persistence of 0.41, which is close to the empirical estimates of 0.11 and 0.36 reported in Favilukis and Lin (2011) . It also generates an average ratio of adjustment cost to output of around 1% per year and an average disinvestment rate of 1%, consistent with the findings of Hall (2004), Merz and Yashiv (2007) , and Abel and Eberly (2002) . The operating cost coefficient f is calibrated to match the average book-to-market ratio of 0.67 from Pontiff and Schall (1998) as closely as possible, and it is set to 0.226. The fraction of investment expenditure in the first period w is set to 0.2, consistent with the finding of Lamont (2000) that more than three-quarters of the annual variations in aggregate investment growth are explained by investment plans.
The persistence of aggregate productivity process ρ x is set to 0.92, following King and Rebelo (1999) . The persistence of investment-specific technology shocks and the conditional volatility of investment-specific technology shocks relative to aggregate productivity shocks are equal to 0.66 and 2.5, respectively, from the real data. The average level of aggregate productivity,X, is a scaling variable. It is calibrated to 0.463 to normalize the average long-run capital stock at one. The average level of investment-specific technology stateQ is set to 0.835, matching an average investment rate of 15% reported by Abel and Eberly (2002) . To calibrate the persistence ρ z and the conditional volatility σ z of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, I impose restrictions on the volatilities of firm-level stock returns and return-on-equity. In particular, I set ρ z = 0.7 and σ z = 0.35, which implies an average firmlevel stock return volatility of about 47% per year, and a return-on-equity volatility of 24%. The real risk-free rate is constant and equals the 1.8% per year reported in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). Following Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) , I set the leverage ratio parameter Φ to 1.667.
The risk price γ x , the conditional volatility σ x of aggregate productivity shocks, and the risk price γ q for investment-specific shocks are used to jointly match the first two moments of market excess returns and the annual volatility of aggregate profitability. Therefore, I set γ x = 2.8, σ x = 0.06, and γ q = 20, which implies an average market excess return of 7.14%
with a standard deviation of 18.3% and aggregate profitability volatility of 14.0%. These three moments are very close to 7.13%, 19.84%, and 13.3% in the data, respectively. The implied volatility of output growth is 6.81%, slightly higher than the empirical estimate of about 5% in my sample.
It is worth noting that even though one main goal of this paper is to reproduce price momentum in the cross section, it does not generate a counterfactually large aggregate market momentum, as the autocorrelation in the time series of the market excess return is only 0.077. In addition, the model-implied negative correlation between momentum profits and the value premium is -0.28, which compares well with -0.50 for the empirical counterpart and -0.29 between the HML and UMD factors.
Results
The model has no analytical solution, so I resort to value function iterations to solve it numerically. The details of the numerical solution can be found in Appendix A-2.
Value function and investment policy function
The model's five state variables are X, Q, Z, K, and LK. In the top graph of Figure 1 , I plot the value function for the case X =X, Q =Q, and Z = 1 against capital stock (K t ) and the committed investment rate (LK t−1 ). The firm value is increasing in capital stock when the committed investment rate is low, consistent with the implication from standard investment-based models. However, when the committed investment rate is high, the relationship between capital and value becomes nonmonotonic. In particular, at a smaller capital region, the firm value increases with capital stock, because capital is below steady state and extra committed investment is valuable for the firm. When capital stock is above some threshold, the firm's value actually drops with additional units of capital. This is intuitive because when the committed investment rate is high, it is extremely costly to reduce the redundant capital due to the asymmetric specification of the capital adjustment cost. In this scenario, firms are very sensitive to business conditions, inducing a large discount effect. Even though the extra unit of capital generates more future cash flows, the discount channel dominates the cash flow channel, giving rise to a low firm value.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
A similar argument holds along the dimension of the committed investment rate. When the capital stock is low, a high investment commitment adds value to the firm, as it allows a quicker adjustment to the steady state of capital stock than in the case of firms with a low investment commitment. However, when capital stock is sufficiently high, the discount channel from investment commitment will dominate, which lowers the firm's value. The bottom panel of Figure 1 plots the policy function for the newly committed investment rate. The general pattern is that a higher stock of capital and a higher committed investment rate are associated with a lower policy committed investment rate.
Momentum profits and the value premium
In this section, I compare the model implications for momentum profits and the value premium in the benchmark calibration with empirical estimates. 100 independent samples are simulated, with each sample representing 80 years and 2,000 firms. The empirical procedure is implemented on each simulated sample, and cross-simulation results are reported.
In Table 4 , I compare the momentum portfolio returns and the results of asset pricing tests from the model with the data. Deviating from Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) procedures, I form 10 momentum portfolios in December of year t − 1 based on the cumulative returns from January to November of year t − 1 to avoid microstructure concerns. The portfolios are rebalanced at the end of every December and held for the next 12 months, replicating the timing and procedure implied from the model. It also should be noted that by lowering the frequency of trading, the average momentum profits, as well as the transaction cost, are smaller than the standard Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) procedures, which rely on rebalancings at monthly frequency.
[Insert Table 4 Here] This model generates a large momentum profit: the average excess return for the simulated loser portfolio is 4.26% per year (2.94% in the data), compared with the winner portfolio of 10.67% (10.73% in the data), implying an average momentum profit slightly lower than the empirical counterpart of 7.79%. The unconditional CAPM captures large time series variations of momentum portfolio returns, but fails to explain the momentum profits in the cross section. The simulated loser portfolio has a market beta of 1.10, even higher than 0.98 for the simulated winner portfolio, implying an abnormal return α(CAP M ) spread between winners and losers even larger than the return spread. Indeed, the average Jensen's α for the spread portfolio from simulations is about 7.27%, compared with 9.83% in the data. The failure of the unconditional CAPM can also be seen in the top left two plots in Figure 2 , where the CAPM predicted returns are compared with the average momentum portfolios returns.
[Insert Figure 2 Here] When the I-shocks are included in the asset pricing test, there is a substantial improvement in the model fit. The last 7 rows of each panel in Table 4 report the results from an asset pricing test based on the two-factor model, with the market portfolio and the I-shock as the risk factors. The I-shock betas increase monotonically from the loser portfolio to the winner portfolio, and the exposure of the spread portfolio-which takes a long position in the winner portfolio and a short position in the loser portfolio-to the I-shock is positive and significantly different from zero. In addition, the time series R 2 of the spread portfolio increases substantially from 8.64% in the CAPM to 19.73% for the two-factor model in the real data, and from 12.52% to 34.04% in the model, capturing the fact that a large proportion of variations of momentum portfolio returns is correlated with the I-shocks. The improvement of model performance can also be illustrated by comparing the top right two plots in Figure 2 , where the two-factor model predicted returns are significantly closer to the average realized momentum portfolio returns than the predictions from the CAPM. What about the model implication for the value premium? It is well known that growth (value) firms are similar to winner (loser) firms in many aspects, but their return predictions are exactly the opposite. In addition, the correlation between the value premium and momentum profits are significantly negative, making it a very difficult task to reproduce both value and momentum in one framework. Indeed, existing models that generate positive momentum profits in the rational momentum literature (e.g., Johnson (2002)) also predict that growth firms have a lower expected return than value firms (i.e., a counterfactual growth premium). Table 5 reports the first two moments of portfolio returns and asset pricing tests for 10 book-to-market portfolios, the top panel for the data and the bottom panel for the model. Consistent with empirical data, the average return and its standard deviation increase from growth firms (Lo) to value firms (Hi), with a return spread of 2.53% per year, smaller than 6.33% per year in the data.
7 The unconditional CAPM does a decent job in capturing the value premium. Market betas follow a similar pattern as the portfolio returns and display an upward trend from growth firms to value firms. The market beta for the spread portfolio (H-L), which takes a long position in value firms and a short position in growth firms, has a market beta of 0.55, a positive and significant value and close to the empirical estimate of 0.43 in the data. After controlling for market risk, the abnormal return of the spread portfolio is no longer statistically significant. This is also illustrated in the bottom left two plots in Figure 2 . In both the data and the model, the 10 portfolio returns are aligned well around the 45-degree line, suggesting the good performance of CAPM in capturing the cross-sectional variation in average returns of the book-to-market portfolios.
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[Insert Table 5 Here]
The last 7 rows of each panel in Table 5 report the performance of the two-factor model. The inclusion of I-shocks adds essentially little explanatory power to the portfolio returns in both the data and the model. The time series regression R 2 s barely change from the one-factor CAPM to the two-factor model, and the loadings of book-to-market portfolios on I-shocks are insignificant for all portfolios in the model and for 7 out of 10 portfolios in the data. In addition, no systematic pattern for these I-shock loadings is observed from growth firms to value firms. Of course, the two-factor model improves the explanatory power of the average simulated portfolio returns in the cross section, as can be concluded by comparing the CAPM performance with the two-factor model performance in the bottom middle and bottom right plots in Figure 2 .
Inspecting mechanism
In the previous subsection, I compared the implications of the investment-based asset pricing model on momentum profits and the value premium with the real data. The model does a good job in reproducing several salient aspects of the data: (1) the coexistence of positive and sizable momentum profits and value premium; (2) the failure (success) of the CAPM in capturing momentum profits (the value premium) ; and (3) the improvement of the asset pricing test on momentum profits by including I-shocks. In this subsection, I explore more details of the economic mechanism in the model that generates these results.
Sources of risk exposures
To study the mechanism of this model in generating momentum profits and the value premium, I first investigate the difference in the roles played by the two aggregate shocks. In particular, I regress the momentum and book-to-market portfolio returns directly on the aggregate productivity (TFP) shocks and I-shocks. The relative contributions of these two shocks should shed light on the underlying story.
The regression results are reported in Table 6 . Rows 2-5 of each panel present the exposures of the momentum portfolios to TFP shocks and I-shocks, followed by the total explanatory power R 2 from these two aggregate shocks (row 6) and the R 2 from univariate regressions on each of these shocks (rows 7 and 8). The results for book-to-market portfolios are reported similarly in rows 9-16. Due to limitations on the availability of the TFP shocks, I restrict the sample to the period 1948-2011.
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[Insert Table 6 Here]
In the data, the loser portfolio has a TFP shock beta of 1.89, which is higher than 1.51 for the winner portfolio. The TFP shocks explain only 0.41% of the time series variation of the momentum profit, out of the total 12.69% from these two aggregate shocks. On the other hand, there is a roughly monotonic increase in I-shock betas from losers to winners, and the exposure in I-shocks explains 12.58% out of 12.69% of the time series variation of momentum profits. These patterns for momentum portfolios are replicated in the model: the loser firms have a higher TFP exposure (3.31) than the winner firms (2.85), and the TFP shock explains the only a small fraction of return variations in the spread portfolio (12.13% out of 31.34%), which is in contrast to the R 2 of 19.16% contributed by the I-shocks.
The bottom 8 rows of each panel in Table 6 report the results for the book-to-market portfolios. The value firms have a substantially higher exposure to TFP shocks than the growth firms, in both the data and the model. This result is consistent with the findings in Gourio (2007) that value firms have more procyclical profits than growth firms. The opposite pattern in TFP betas also explain the negative correlation between the value premium and momentum profits in the model. On the other hand, no substantial variations in I-shock betas can be found among these book-to-market portfolios. The spread portfolio has insignificant exposure to I-shocks, whose explanatory power in the time series variation of returns of the spread portfolio is only around 1%. In untabulated analysis, I project the simulated market returns onto these two aggregate shocks, and it turns out that almost 87% of the market returns are explained by the TFP shocks, whereas the I-shocks contribute only around 3%. This also provides an explanation for the good performance of the CAPM in capturing the simulated value premium.
In summary, even though the investment-based model generates both positive momentum profits and value premium, the underlying forces for these two phenomena are very different. Although TFP shocks play a key role in the value premium, momentum profits are mainly driven by the investment-specific technology shocks, as confirmed by the evidence in the data.
Dynamics in the event window
The previous subsection concluded by emphasizing the different roles played by aggregate productivity shocks and investment-specific technology shocks in explaining momentum profits and the value premium. Nevertheless, it leaves the following question open: Why does the sensitivity to TFP shocks (I-shocks) in value (loser) firms differ from that in growth (winner) firms? This subsection provides an answer to this question by looking at the dynamics of book-to-market and momentum portfolios around the portfolio rebalancing time.
To be specific, at the end of year t, I form 10 portfolios based on either the past 1-year return or book-to-market and keep track of the return on equity (ROE), investment-tocapital ratio (IK), and portfolio returns (Ret) over an 11-year window -5 years before and 5 years after -around year t. I then take the average over the time series of each event year for the whole sample period, which gives the average dynamics of these portfolio characteristics over the 11-year window. To align the timing of portfolio rebalancings with the Compustat data, I restrict my sample to firms with a fiscal year-end of December, and portfolios are rebalanced every December and held for the next 12 months. This type of "event study" procedure is used in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) and Fama and French (1995) , followed by many others. Table 7 reports the dynamics for the winner and loser portfolios. The profitability of winners is higher than that for losers, but this is only prominent starting two years before portfolio rebalancing in the data and one year in the model. In other words, winners are short-term winners, and losers are short-term losers. The high firm-level productivity induces winners to initiate more investment, as is clear from rows 4-5 in Table 7 : winners have a higher investment rate IK starting from the portfolio rebalancing year. One important observation is that the investment spread between winners and losers is substantially larger at event year one than event year zero, and then gradually converges. Therefore, the investment dynamics is hump-shaped for winners and U-shaped for losers.
[Insert Table 7 Here] It is worth emphasizing that the standard q-theory of investment with convex capital adjustment costs cannot generate this pattern of investment dynamics. With a positive firm-specific productivity shock, standard q-theory models predict that the firm's investment shoots up immediately and gradually declines due to the friction of convex adjustment costs, instead of being hump-shaped. This is exactly the motivation for the friction that is used in the investment-based model of this paper: investment commitment. Firms that have experienced a good productivity shock cannot immediately build up their capital stock. The investment commitment structure requires firms to commit to investing a large portion for the next year when they make an investment decision, which gives rise to a hump-shaped response in investment rates.
Taken together, the above observations indicate that the mechanism for generating a positive momentum profit is the following: winner firms are those that had high profitability in the recent past. They initiate more investment and make a greater commitment to future investment. Investment commitment is risky because it is in terms of future capital expenditure. In a world in which the price of investment goods is stochastic, winner firms will therefore have a high risk exposure to I-shocks. On the other hand, loser firms suffer from recent low profitability. They initiate less (more) investment (disinvestment) and commit to less (greater) investment (disinvestment) in the future. The commitment to disinvest serves as a hedge to loser firms, as a higher price of investment goods in the future implies that fewer units of existing capital need to be resold, which to some extent relieves the pain originating from low profitability. Therefore, loser firms have a low (or even a negative) exposure to I-shocks. When the I-shock is a priced risk factor with a positive risk premium, the expected momentum profit is positive.
This mechanism hence provides a theoretical explanation for the findings of Liu and Zhang (2011) that the expected marginal profitability and expected growth of investment rate are the main characteristics that are related to momentum profits. Based on the intuition of my model, the high (low) profitability for winners (losers) is expected because of the persistence of firm-level productivity, and the high (low) investment growth for winners (losers) is expected because of the wedge driven by the friction of investment commitment. This friction also changes the risk exposure of winner and loser firms to investment-specific technology shocks, giving rise to different expected returns. The story also relates momentum profits with the ROE factor in Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2012) . In an investment-based new four-factor model, Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2012) find that the ROE factor is the most important factor that captures momentum profits. Intuitively, winner firms have a higher profitability (or ROE) than loser firms, implying a positive correlation between the ROE factor and momentum profits.
The model also quantitatively captures the reversal of the profitability in momentum strategies. In the empirical data, if investors hold the momentum spread portfolio beyond one year, they would have a profitability of -4.66% in the second year and -1.92% for the third year. In the simulated data, even though the model generates sizable momentum profits of 6.46% in the first year, the profitability drops to 0.16% in the second year and becomes -1.17% in the third year. Therefore, this model does not produce counterfactual persistent momentum profits as in most, if not all, studies in the literature that explore a rational explanation. The risk exposures to the market factor and I-shocks reported in rows 8-11 of Table 7 provide some insights into the short life of momentum profits. The exposure to investment-specific technology shocks β I-shock are persistent through several years following portfolio rebalancing due to the persistence of firm-specific productivity and convex adjustment costs, and this exposure is higher for the winner portfolio than for the loser portfolio until the end of the third event year and then reverses. This pattern is observed in both the empirical and simulated data. On the other hand, the market beta β M KT of the winner portfolio is almost always lower than the loser portfolio after the portfolio rebalancing because of the operating leverage effect described before. By taking into account the exposures to both market and I-shock factors, the model does a good job in capturing the short life of momentum profits.
Turning to the value premium, Table 8 reports the dynamics for the growth firms and value firms. Consistent with Fama and French (1995) , growth firms have higher profitability than value firms, especially during the several years around portfolio rebalancing. They invest more and have low future returns than the value firms after the portfolio formation. Therefore, the story for the value premium in this model borrows from Zhang (2005) and Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) : value firms are those that had experienced a series of bad firm-specific productivity shocks in the past few years and are burdened with redundant assets, due to the high adjustment cost for disinvestment. In addition, the fixed operating cost substantially increases the operating leverage, making these firms very sensitive to business conditions (proxied by aggregate productivity shocks). As such, value firms will demand a higher risk premium than growth firms.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
Note that even though the value premium and momentum profits are both driven by different firm-level productivity shocks, the timing is important to disentangle these two phenomena: firms become value (growth) firms if they had low (high) productivity shocks for a period of 2-5 years before portfolio formation, whereas firms become winners (losers) if they had high (low) productivity shocks in the recent past (around one year). Therefore, even though value (growth) firms are in many aspects similar to loser (winner) firms, the difference in timing induces totally different exposures to aggregate shocks and the coexistence of the value premium and momentum profits in the model.
Alternative calibrations
In this subsection, I provide additional evidence on the mechanism by studying the model implications under alternative calibrations. Since the previous section suggests the important roles that investment-specific technology shocks and investment commitment play in momentum profits, and the roles of adjustment costs and fixed operating costs on the value premium, changing the corresponding parameters of the model would directly affect the magnitude and even the signs of these premiums.
The results under different calibrations are reported in Table 9 . The specification 0 is from real data, and specification 1 is under the benchmark calibration used for comparison. In specification 2, I shut down the I-shocks so that the price of investment goods relative to outputs is constant. Without the additional aggregate shocks, the firm investment rate becomes more persistent and less volatile. In addition, the equity premium is only 3.9% per year, which is about 55% of the equity premium under the benchmark calibration. In the cross section, although the value premium is slightly smaller than the benchmark, the momentum profits become negative (-1.23%). This finding is not surprising, given that the I-shock is the main driver for momentum profits in the model. When the channel of I-shocks is shut down, firms are exposed only to TFP shocks. Therefore, loser firms, which have a low firm value and a high operating leverage, would be more sensitive to the variation of aggregate productivity and demand a higher risk premium than winner firms.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
To check the importance of operating costs in explaining the value premium, I tune down the operating cost f to 0.2 in specification 3. A lower fixed operating cost does not affect quantities very much. For example, the firm-level investment rate and the return on equity remains essentially the same as in the benchmark calibration, whereas the aggregate profitability is slightly more volatile because of the operating leverage effect. On the asset pricing side, both market excess returns and momentum profits become smaller in magnitude, and interestingly, the value premium is now negative.
More precisely, a lower operating cost has two effects on momentum profits. The direct effect is the operating leverage as mentioned above; this lowers momentum profits because firms are less levered. There is also an indirect effect: when the operating leverage is lower, loser (winner) firms are less similar to value (growth) firms in that the difference in the exposure to TFP shocks is getting smaller, which tends to increase momentum profits. In specification 3, the direct effect is dominating the indirect effect, and momentum profits end up to be smaller than the benchmark calibration.
In the next exercise (specification 4), I shut down the investment commitment by imposing w = 1. With the removal of the investment commitment friction, firms are more free to adjust their capital stocks, and their investment is less persistent but more volatile. This also implies a smaller risk premium in both the aggregate and the cross section, because firms now have an improved capability to smooth their dividends. Indeed, the equity premium is only 2.95% per year, and the value premium and momentum profits fall to 0.48% and 0.72%, respectively.
Specification 5 explores another extreme. When w = 0, a firm can do nothing regarding today's capital expenditure if it is hit by a productivity shock; all it can do is change the investment commitment (or plan) for the next year. This essentially increases the capital adjustment friction, and exogenous shocks will be more absorbed by asset prices rather than quantities. Consistent with this argument, the firm-level investment is less volatile and the equity premium is higher than the benchmark calibration. In addition, since investment commitment plays a bigger role under this calibration, momentum profits (7.53%) are also substantially higher than the benchmark of 6.42%.
Further implications
In this section, I explore additional implications of the model. Section 4.4.1 studies the relation between momentum profits and market states, and Section 4.4.2 studies other premiums related to firm characteristics.
Predictability of momentum profits
Momentum profits are well known to vary across business cycles. For example, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) analyze the relation between momentum strategies and business cycles, and using a sample from 1926 to 1994, they show that momentum payoffs are negative during recessions and positive during expansions, and the difference in payoffs between the two periods is statistically and economically significant. In a related paper, Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) document that momentum profits can be predicted by past market returns, or market states. In particular, the mean monthly momentum profit following positive market returns is 0.93%, whereas the mean profit following negative market returns is -0.37%.
The investment-based asset pricing model in this paper can also produce qualitatively similar patterns for momentum profits. Table 10reports the relation between average momentum profits and market states. The average simulated momentum profit is 6.91% per year in market "up" states and 3.88% in "down" states, compared with 11.79% and -1.35%, respectively, in the data. Even though the spread in simulated momentum profits across market states is not as large as in the real data, this difference is both economically and statistically significant. Panel B of Table 10 reports the predictive regression of momentum profits at year t + 1 on the lag cumulative market returns, with the lag equal to one, two, and three years. Consistent with the real data, the lagged market return also turns out to be a significant predictor for future momentum profits in the simulated data.
[Insert Table 10 Here] These results are interesting and intuitive given the mechanism described in previous sections. Among the two aggregate factors, the I-shock is "unconditional" in generating momentum profits, in the sense that winners tend to initiate more investment commitment than losers (and hence have a greater exposure to I-shocks), no matter what the business condition is. On the other hand, the market factor (the market) plays a "conditional" role. When the market went up in the previous year (market "up"), winner firms are those with the highest market betas. In this market state, the betas of the winner-minus-loser spread portfolio for I-shocks and for market are both positive, so the total risk premium is positive and high. When the market went down in the previous year, however, these two factors generate opposite predictions in the risk premium. In this case, the market beta for loser firms is substantially higher than for winner firms, inducing a negative exposure of the spread portfolio to the market factor.
10 Therefore, market states provide information about the risk exposure of the spread portfolio to market factor, and hence are capable of predicting future momentum profits. In addition, the one-year-lagged market return contains more accurate information about the market beta; therefore, it should have a stronger predictive power than the cumulative two-or three-year market performance. This is clearly confirmed in both the real and simulated data from Panel B in Table 10 : the estimated coefficient from the one-year-lagged market return is almost double or more than double that estimated from the two-or three-year cumulative market returns. Careful readers might ask the following question: What if the investment-specific technology shock can be predicted by the stock market in the previous year? Or more specifically: Can we still see the significant comovement between momentum profits and I-shocks after controlling for the lagged market returns? To address this question, I test a conditional two-factor model: besides the market factor and I-shocks, I also include an interaction term between the current market and one-year-lagged market returns. Since the lagged market returns contain useful information about the market beta, including this interaction term should improve model performance. Table 11 reports the results from the conditional two-factor model. In both the real data and the simulated data, there is a clear upward pattern on the loadings of the interaction term from the loser portfolio to the winner portfolio, confirming the fact that market betas are time varying for momentum portfolios. In addition, by comparing the R 2 s from this conditional two-factor model with those from the unconditional two-factor model reported in Table 4 , the inclusion of this interaction term increases the model fitting on the spread portfolio from 19.73% to 37.45% in the real data, and from 34.04% to 38.09% in the simulated data. However, the role of I-shocks is not driven away by this additional term; the risk exposure of the spread portfolio remains positive and significant after controlling for the time-varying market betas. This confirms the independent role of investment-specific technology shocks in capturing momentum profits.
[Insert Table 11 Here]
The separate roles of the market factor and I-shocks can also help to rationalize the socalled momentum crash documented in Daniel and Moskowitz (2011) , that is, momentum profits crash after a market crash. Intuitively, when the market fell dramatically, as it did during the Great Depression and the 2008 financial crisis, the effect from the market factor dominates that of investment-specific technology shocks, generating a negative risk premium for the spread portfolio. Consistent with this argument, the average simulated momentum profit after a market crash (defined as ≤ −60%) is -13.4%.
Other firm characteristic related returns
Additional predictions of this model include stock returns in the cross section such as the size premium and the long-term contrarian premium. Small stocks perform better than large stocks, 11 and this effect has been included as one of the standard risk factors in Fama and French (1993) in explaining cross-sectional stock returns. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) show that stocks that perform poorly in the past three to five years outperform those that perform well over the next three years.
The investment-based model in this paper provides an explanation for these phenomena. Intuitively, firms with a small market cap and low long-term prior returns are firms that had suffered from low productivity in the long run. Similar to the value firms, they have a high operating leverage and hence a higher exposure to TFP shocks (and the market factor) and higher expected returns. To test this intuition, I report the portfolio returns and the exposures to the market factor and investment-specific technology shocks for the size and long-term contrarian portfolios in Table 12. [Insert Table 12 Here] 11 See, for example, Banz (1981), Reinganum (1981) , and Keim (1983).
The investment-based model generates a size premium of 3.76% per year, compared with 7.78% per year for the sample 1983-2011. In the two-factor model tests, the market beta is significantly higher for the small firms than for the big firms, whereas the exposures to the I-shocks are almost flat across portfolios. This confirms the role of TFP shocks and the operating leverage channel in generating a positive size premium. On the other hand, the model-implied long-term losers outperform the long-term winners by 4.19%, and large portion of this difference is captured by the market exposure, which is again consistent with the above intuition. The model therefore provides a unified explanation for the return predictability by past returns at different horizons and emphasizes the importance of timing. Different intervals of prior returns contain different information about loadings on the risk factors. In particular, long-term prior returns mainly capture information on the loadings on TFP shocks (or the market factor), whereas short-term prior returns are closely related to the loadings on I-shocks.
Risk premium of investment-specific technology shocks
The model presented in this paper calls for a positive risk price of investment-specific technology shocks to rationalize the profitability of momentum strategies. However, the risk price of this macroeconomic variable is still debatable in the literature. For instance, Papanikolaou (2011) documents that in the post-1963 sample value firms have a lower risk exposure to Ishocks than growth firms, implying a negative risk premium of I-shocks. Garlappi and Song (2012) , however, find that the inference from book-to-market sorted portfolios indicates that the price of risk for I-shocks changes sign from positive in the earlier sample 1930-1962 to negative in the later sample 1963-2010. In this section, I provide additional evidence for the risk price of I-shocks.
Following Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005) and Liu and Zhang (2008) , I use 10 momentum, 10 book-to-market, and 10 size portfolios from Kenneth French's Web site as the testing assets. The risk premium is estimated through a two-stage Fama-MacBeth regression, where in the first-stage estimation, portfolio returns are regressed on the time series of the market factor and I-shocks, generating the factor loadings. In the second-stage cross-sectional regression, the average portfolio returns are regressed on the risk exposures estimated from the first stage, generating the risk premium.
12 The results are reported in Table 13 .
[Insert Table 13 Here]
Panel A of Table 13 presents the factor loadings from the time series regressions. Since the results for the size and book-to-market portfolios are already documented in Tables 5 and  12 , I simply duplicate factor loadings here for completeness. Consistent with the momentum strategy used in Table 4 , the Fama-French momentum portfolios also display an upward trend for risk exposures to I-shocks from loser to winner portfolios. The value firms now have a slightly higher I-shock beta, in line with the findings of Garlappi and Song (2012) that the decreasing pattern of I-shock betas during 1963-2010 no longer exist in the long sample 1930-2010.
Panel B of Table 13 reports the estimated risk premium and the model performance. The estimated price of risk for the market factor is 7.68% per year, very close to the sample average of market portfolio excess returns. The risk price for investment-specific technology shocks is 4.69% per year, which is more than 3.6 standard deviations from zero. This positive and significant estimate for the I-shock risk premium therefore provides empirical support for the model assumption. The two-factor model does a decent job in fitting the portfolio returns in the cross section. The mean absolute error for the 30 portfolios is only 1.25% per year, lower than 1.74% from the CAPM tests and 1.65% from the Fama-French three-factor model tests (untabulated). Even though the χ 2 test rejects the model, this two-factor model explains about 71.4% of the cross-sectional returns, and the GLS-R 2 , which has an economic interpretation of mean-variance efficiency of these two risk factors, is about 27.5%. As mentioned earlier, one disadvantage of the definition of investment-specific technology shocks using relative prices is that quality adjustment in NIPA is not sufficient. To avoid the quality adjustment, I follow Kogan and Papanikolaou (2012) and define an alternative measure of I-shocks as the changes in the ratios of investment to consumption expenditure (dIC). In their model, Kogan and Papanikolaou (2012) show that dIC is monotonically increasing in the investment-specific technology shocks. With this new definition of I-shocks, I replicate the two-stage Fama-MacBeth regression in Table 14 .
[Insert Table 14 Here]
The results reported in Table 14 are broadly consistent with the findings from the definition using relative prices. The I-shock exposure remains monotonically increasing from losers to winners. The estimated risk price for the market factor is 8.67% per year, and for dIC is 10.59% per year (with a t-stat of 2.76). Therefore, the concern for quality adjustment in the measure of investment-specific technology shocks does not significantly affect the estimation of its risk prices, especially for the sign.
Conclusion
Momentum profits and the value premium are similar to each other in many aspects, but because of their strong negative correlation, most of the literature with a rational expectations framework focuses on only one phenomenon while remaining silent on the other. This paper proposes an investment-based asset pricing model to include both phenomena in one framework. Intuitively, the different timing associated with these two strategies allows for different information sets; therefore, the sources of risk exposures can also be different.
In this paper, I argue that the performance of past short-term winners and losers could differ because their exposure to investment-specific technology shocks (I-shocks) is different. The friction of investment commitment drives a wedge between the realized firm-level profitability and the firm's capital expenditure, and the implied investment dynamics are deviating from that implied by standard q-theory with convex adjustment costs. This friction also changes the risk profiles of firms that are making investment commitment decisions, thus generating different exposures to the changing price of investment goods (or I-shocks). On the other hand, value and growth firms have different average returns because of their sensitivities to TFP shocks, and the operating leverage and costly capital adjustment mechanism is similar to that in Zhang (2005) and Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) . The investment-based model that incorporates these mechanisms simultaneously reproduces several salient features of cross-sectional stock returns, including the coexistence of momentum profits and the value premium, the failure of the unconditional CAPM in explaining momentum, the relation between market states and momentum profits, the reversal of the profitability of momentum strategies, and the explanatory power of prior returns on future stock returns at both short and long horizons.
APPENDIX A-1 Investment-specific technology shocks
The data used to construct the time series of investment-specific technology shocks are from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) at the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) , the relative price of investment goods to nondurable consumption goods is defined as the ratio between the price deflator for nondurable goods of personal consumption expenditures (row 5 of NIPA table 1.1.9) and the price deflator for equipment and software of gross private domestic investment (row 11 of NIPA table 1.1.9), and the investment-specific technology shock is the negative percentage change of this relative price from the previous year. The alternative measure used in Section 4.5 follows Kogan and Papanikolaou (2012) , and it is defined as the changes in the logarithm of the ratio of nonresidential fixed investment expenditure (row 9 of NIPA 
A-2 Numerical solution
The investment-based asset pricing model is solved via the value function iteration. The state space is discretized on 5-dimensional grids. In particular, the AR(1) processes for aggregate productivity log(X), investment-specific technology log(Q), and idiosyncratic productivity log(Z) are each modeled as a Markov chain. The discretization approach follows Rouwenhorst (1995) , and I use 3 grid points for the log(X) and log(Z) processes, and 5 grids for the log(Q) process. Since the curvature of the value function is higher when capital stock is low, I choose the capital grid points following a geometric series, so that more grid points are concentrated in the small capital region. For the grid of the committed investment rate, I use the equal space. I specify 51 grid points for capital stocks and 21 grid points for the committed investment rate.
With the grids set up, I iterate the value functions by continuously searching the optimal policy committed investment rate. When calculating the next period firm value against capital and the committed investment rate in both value function iterations and simulations, I extensively use quadratic polynomial interpolations.
Yang, Fan, 2011, Investment shocks and the commodity basis spread, working paper The University of Hong Kong.
Zhang, Lu, 2005, The value premium, Journal of Finance 60, 67-103. and the macroeconomic variables, including GDP growth (GDPG), growth rate of nondurable consumption (NDUG), and service (SERVG). The investment-specific technology shock is defined as the negative change in the price deflator of investment goods relative to that of nondurable consumption goods. MKT is the market return in excess of the risk-free rate, UMD is the momentum factor, HML is the high-minus-low book-to-market factor, and SMB is the small-minus-big size factor. The right part of the This table reports unconditional moments generated from the simulated data and real data. 100 samples are simulated, with each sample representing 80 years and 2,000 firms, and the cross-simulation average annual moments are reported. The mean, standard deviation, and AR(1) coefficient of market excess returns are from the annual sample 1930-2011. The average risk-free rate is from Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). The volatility of individual stock returns is estimated from all NYSE/AMEX firms in CRSP. The average investment rate and disinvestment rate are from Abel and Eberly (2002). The volatility and persistence of the firm-level investment rate are from Favilukis and Lin (2011). The volatility of the firm-level return on equity is from Vuolteenaho (2002) , and the volatility of aggregate profits is from Bazdresch, Belo, and Lin (2012). The range for average adjustment cost-output ratio is estimated from Hall (2004) and Merz and Yashiv (2007) , and the average book-to-market ratio is from Pontiff and Schall (1998 Table 4 : Momentum profits
This table shows the first two moments of momentum portfolio returns and asset pricing test results. The top panel presents the results with empirical data, where I rebalance momentum portfolios in December of each year and hold for one year. Momentum at year t is defined as the cumulative returns from January to November of year t − 1 to avoid microstructure concerns. The sample is annual from 1930 to 2011. The bottom panel shows the results from simulated data, where 100 samples are simulated, with each sample representing 80 years and for 2,000 firms. Momentum for firm i at time t is defined as the stock return at year t − 1 in the model. The first two rows of each panel report the annual mean and standard deviation of the excess returns of momentum portfolios and the spread portfolio with a long position in the past winners and a short position in the past losers. The middle five rows report the results from the unconditional CAPM, including abnormal returns α(CAP M ), market exposure β M KT (CAP M ) and the time series R 2 (CAP M ). The bottom seven rows report the two-factor model (TF) test results, with market excess returns and investmentspecific technology shocks as risk factors, including the intercept Cte(T F ), market exposure β M KT (T F ), and exposure to investment-specific technology shocks β I-shock (T F ), and the time series R 2 (T F ). Newey-West t-stats given in parentheses control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. data, where 100 samples are simulated, with each sample representing 80 years and 2,000 firms. Book-to-market for firm i at time t in the model is defined as the ratio of capital K it−1 at the beginning of year t−1 to the ex-dividend firm value (V it−2 − D it−2 ) at the end of year t − 2. The first two rows of each panel report the annual mean and standard deviation of the excess returns of the 10 book-tomarket portfolios and the spread portfolio with a long position in the value firms and a short position in the growth firms. The middle five rows report the results from the unconditional CAPM, including abnormal returns α(CAP M ), market exposure β M KT (CAP M ) and the time series R 2 (CAP M ). The bottom seven rows report the two-factor model (TF) test results, with market excess returns and investment-specific technology shocks as risk factors, including the intercept Cte(T F ), market exposure β M KT (T F ), and exposure to investmentspecific technology shocks β I-shock (T F ), and the time series R 2 (T F ). Newey-West t-stats given in parentheses control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Table 6 : Sources of risk exposures This table presents the explanatory power of total factor productivity (TFP) shocks and investment-specific technology shocks (I-shocks) on momentum and book-to-market portfolio returns, in both the real data and the model. Portfolio excess returns are regressed on these two shocks, and the factor loadings and R 2 from this two-factor model R 2 (T ot) are reported. Also reported is the univariate regression R 2 for each of these two shocks. The top panel presents the results with empirical data, where book-to-market portfolio returns are from Kenneth French's Web site. Momentum at year t is defined as the cumulative returns from January to November of year t − 1 to avoid microstructure concerns. The sample is annual from 1948 to 2011. The bottom panel shows the results from simulated data, where 100 samples are simulated, with each sample representing 80 years and for 2,000 firms. Bookto-market for firm i at time t in the model is defined as the ratio of capital K it−1 at the beginning of year t − 1 to the ex-dividend firm value (V it−2 − D it−2 ) at the end of year t − 2. Momentum for firm i at time t is defined as the stock return at year t − 1 in the model. Newey-West t-stats given in parentheses control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. This table reports the implied moments for both quantities and asset prices under alternative calibrations. The moments from the real data are reported under specification 0, and the benchmark calibration under specification 1. The alternative calibrations includes the following: no investment-specific technology shocks (specification 2), low fixed operating cost f = 0.2 (specification 3), no investment commitment w = 1 (specification 4), and full investment planning w = 0 (specification 5). (2004), I define the market state in year t being "up" when the market return from the previous year t − 1 is positive, and being "down" when the market return from the previous year t − 1 is negative. The momentum profits across market "up" and "down" states are summarized in Panel A. In Panel B, the momentum profit at year t + 1 is regressed on the lag cumulative market returns up to year t, where a lag equals one, two, or three years. 100 samples are simulated, with each sample representing 80 years and for 2000 firms. Newey-West t-stats given in parentheses control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Table 11 : Conditional two-factor model on momentum portfolio returns This table presents the test results from a conditional two-factor model on momentum portfolio returns. Besides the market portfolio (M KT t ) and investment-specific technology shocks (I-shock t ), I also include the interaction term between the lagged market return and the current market return (M KT t−1 × M KT t ). The top panel presents the results with empirical data, where I rebalance momentum portfolios in December of each year and hold for one year. Momentum at year t is defined as the cumulative returns from January to November of year t − 1 to avoid microstructure concerns. The sample is annual from 1930 to 2011. The bottom panel shows the results from simulated data, where 100 samples are simulated, with each sample representing 80 years and for 2,000 firms. Momentum for firm i at time t is defined as the stock return at year t − 1 in the model. Newey-West t-stats given in parentheses control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Table 12 : The firm size effect and the long-term contrarian effect This table presents the returns and risk exposures to market portfolio and investment-specific technology shocks of the size and long-term contrarian portfolios. The top two panels present the results with empirical data, where size and long-term contrarian portfolio returns are from Kenneth French's Web site. The sample for size portfolios is annual from 1930 to 2011, and the sample for long-term contrarian portfolios is annual from 1931 to 2011. The bottom two panels show the results from simulated data, where 100 samples are simulated, with each sample representing 80 years and for 2,000 firms. Size for firm i at year t in the model is defined as the ex-dividend firm value (V it−1 − D it−1 ) at the end of year t − 1, and long-term contrarian portfolios at year t are based on the prior cumulative returns from year t − 5 to t − 2. The first two rows of each panel report the annual mean and standard deviation of the portfolio excess returns and the spread portfolio with a long position in the big firms (or firms with high past 13-60 month returns) and a short position in the small firms (or firms with low past 13-60 month returns). The bottom four rows of each panel report the market exposure β M KT (CAP M ) and exposure to investment-specific shocks β I-shock in the two-factor model where market and I-shocks are the two risk factors. Newey-West t-stats given in parentheses control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. , and GLS-R 2 from the cross-sectional regression. Newey-West t-stats given in parentheses control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. To address the problem that the risk exposures are estimated from the first stage, I adjust the standard errors from the second-stage regression as proposed in Shanken (1992 This table reports the results from a two-stage Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression on 10 momentum portfolios, 10 size portfolios, and 10 book-to-market portfolios using an alternative proxy for investment-specific technology shocks, namely, the changes in the ratio of investment to consumption expenditure (dIC). The testing model is the two-factor model with with market excess returns (MKT) and dICs as the risk factors. In the first stage, the time series of portfolio excess returns are regressed on the two factors, and the factor loadings are reported in Panel A. The second stage test regresses the average portfolio returns on the factor loadings estimated from the first stage, generating prices of risks, as reported in Panel B. Panel B also reports the mean absolute error (MAE), p-value for the χ 2 test, OLS-R
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, and GLS-R 2 from the cross-sectional regression. Newey-West t-stats given in parentheses control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. To address the problem that the risk exposures are estimated from the first stage, I adjust the standard errors from the second-stage regression as proposed in Shanken (1992 The figure presents the value function (top panel) and policy committed investment rate (bottom panel) against two state variables: capital and committed investment rate, when the other state variables are set to their steady states, i.e., X =X, Q =Q, and Z = 1. The value function and policy function are generated through value function iterations. 
